Standing Committee A

[Janet Anderson in the Chair]

Equality Bill [Lords]

Clause 80 - Regulations

Dominic Grieve: I beg to move amendment No. 162, in clause 80, page 45, line 40, leave out 'or harassment'.

Janet Anderson: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 163, in clause 80, page 46, line 4, leave out sub-paragraph (c).

Dominic Grieve: We now come to part of the Bill that is not controversial in its intention but, I regret to say, is extremely controversial in terms of the way in which the Government have decided to implement it. Although we are mindful of the Government's problems, the introduction of complex legislation relating to discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation on the basis of providing one paragraph of vague guidelines to bring in subsequent regulations is profoundly unsatisfactory. The Minister for Women and Equality will have noted last week's debates on religious discrimination; she will know that important issues needed to be considered then and that we are, in effect, to be deprived of the opportunity of doing that now.
The general problem with regulations, as and when they are brought in, is that there is no possibility of amendment and thus no opportunity to improve them. I know that the Government intend to consult widely before any regulations are introduced, but I am sure that the Minister will be the first to agree that, even after lengthy consultation, it sometimes happens that someone in Committee either here or in another place has an idea that commends itself even to the Government. On that basis—at the risk of repeating what was said on Second Reading—I must register my considerable concern at the manner in which we are proceeding. We do not want to send out a signal that we are not interested in discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. We support what the Government are trying to achieve. All we can do—short of considering on Report whether the clause should be in the Bill at all in its present form—is examine the detail this morning to see whether the framework can be improved. 
Amendment No. 162 relates to harassment. Given that in another place harassment was removed from the part dealing with discrimination on grounds of religion or belief, what should be done with the clause? The Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, the hon. Member for Wythenshawe and Sale, East (Paul Goggins), will appreciate our anxiety. There could be a logical argument for saying that harassment should be included in the regulations. Indeed, the hon. Gentleman said that he might return  to harassment in religious discrimination, after the publication of the report that the Government have commissioned. 
The difficulty is that, if we leave the provision in its present form, it will be impossible to remove harassment unless the Government voluntarily decide to do so. My view is that if harassment is not considered suitable to be included in the legislative framework for religion, there are compelling grounds to leave it out in respect of sexual orientation. I should be grateful to hear the response of the Minister for Women and Equality on that point. The hon. Lady will have noted that amendment No. 160 would ensure that the regulations are of a more prescriptive nature. The merit of our persuading the Government to accept the amendment is that we would have proper definitions. The amendment would also ensure that harassment had subsequently to be included in the regulations. 
For those reasons, I ask the Minister to explain why harassment has been kept in for sexual orientation, but removed for religion. I ask her also to explain to the Committee, in perhaps a bit more detail than was possible on Second Reading, how the Government intend to proceed generally in dealing with the regulatory framework, given that Parliament will not have the opportunity to consider it in detail.

Evan Harris: This appears to be a time for a general discussion of the clause, so I shall first say a few words about its genesis.
The Minister and Committee members will know that my party has long argued for equality on the basis of sexual orientation of the sort that we are discussing—indeed, the first time that we made a serious attempt to achieve that was when my noble Friend Lord Lester introduced an Equality Bill in the House of Lords a number of years ago. It was extremely disappointing that the Government did not take that opportunity to bring in that sort of equality—that is, to end discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation in the provision of goods and services. Ending that discrimination has been in our manifesto on a number of occasions and there is no doubt that the Government have similar intentions. Labour's 1997 manifesto said—

Janet Anderson: Order. If the hon. Gentleman intends to speak on the general nature of the clause, he may prefer to do so on clause stand part, because I have had an indication that another Member would like to contribute on clause stand part. It is entirely up to the hon. Gentleman; he is at liberty to carry on now, if he wishes.

Evan Harris: I am grateful to you for giving me the options of carrying on or not, Mrs. Anderson. I will carry on, and therefore limit my remarks on clause stand part. I have started, so I will finish, so to speak. I have tabled no amendments to the clause.
In the 1997 Labour manifesto, there was a commitment to end unfair discrimination wherever it existed. There is no doubt that the Government agree that the sort of discrimination faced by gays and lesbian in the provision of goods and services exists  and is unfair. One has to ask why, three manifestos and eight years on, we are still trying to get legislation on to the statute book. It is a big disappointment, not only to me but to Members of all parties, that we are still in this situation; it certainly is to the community of people who face that type of discrimination. 
We read about cases of such discrimination regularly, and it almost certainly occurs far more widely than we read about, because victims are not necessarily always in a position to, or willing to, complain. We are talking about the sort of discrimination that leads to the atrocities—there is no other word for them—that we read about in which, tragically, people are killed on the basis of their sexual orientation, as courts have found. We know that there is a great deal of queer-bashing, too. The fact that it is still lawful to discriminate in the provision of goods and services on the basis of sexual orientation at least eight years after that should have ended, given what politicians have said, leads to an atmosphere in which queer-bashing and hate crimes can take place. 
The Government decided that they were going to end discrimination and make unlawful any unreasonable and unfair discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief. The Bill presented an opportunity to do the same in respect of sexual orientation There is no doubt that discrimination on those grounds is just as acute, widespread and damaging to the fabric of our society, and just as hurtful to the victims. It was extremely disappointing that the Government chose not to take the opportunity of the Bill to do that, especially as they had decided, rightly, to tackle the problem in respect of religious discrimination. 
The problem is the creation of hierarchies. The Government are not directly responsible for the discrimination that people face, but they appear to be creating a hierarchy of victims of discrimination, and that is provocative and deeply disappointing. That is why Lord Alli and others rightly proposed amendments to ensure that the same provisions apply to discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. My hon. Friend the Member for Romsey (Sandra Gidley) made those points on Second Reading and they have also been mentioned in the House of Lords. It was disappointing that the Government resisted those amendments. Instead, they have compromised and included a clause giving regulation-making powers. 
In so far as that is better than nothing, as Lord Lester said in the House of Lords, it is welcome compared with the previous position, although it is a second-best option, or a third-best option given that we have had other opportunities to make provision. Nevertheless, we should welcome it in those terms. However, it raises the sort of problems that the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) mentioned in that the regulations will not be subject to amendment and scrutiny, as is possible during Committee and other stages of primary legislation. It would be helpful if the Minister gave some assurances so we know what to expect at a later date. 
On harassment, the hon. Member for Beaconsfield made, as usual, an interesting and important point on  whether the timing of the Bill will ensure that harassment provisions are not controversial. No one wants to see harassment in the criminal sense, or in the sense of the general tort, against people because of their sexual orientation. However, there is a balance to be struck with free speech, which is a difficult issue for a liberal to deal with. People with strong religious views may wish to express them and, while not they may not be discriminating in the provision of goods and services, that may be felt by some to be harassment. We have to ensure that we get the balance right. The balance goes further in respect of restricting free speech than it does in respect of religion, because people can argue about religion and it is natural that one religion will attack another. I do not think that an attack on someone's sexual orientation has the same value in free-speech terms, because sexual orientation is innate—something that someone is—rather like race and gender. 
There are difficult issues to deal with in connection harassment and I hope that the Minister will offer to pre-consult Members of both Houses, rather than just produce draft regulations and have the usual consultation, and discuss with us how the Government propose to deal with that. The understanding is that the regulations will come into force at the same time as the religion or belief measures. Perhaps the Minister will clarify that. If that is so, it will be useful to know whether she envisages that happening before or after the outcome of the discrimination law review and whether that review has any relevance to the way in which harassment will be dealt with. 
The definition of harassment will be important. I do not support the amendment, which I suspect is probing, but it raises issues about which we need reassurance. 
I should also like to know how exceptions will be dealt with. I should be grateful if the Minister explained that, although not in detail, because that would be pre-empting the regulations. There is concern among those who are campaigning for equality for lesbians and gay men that the provisions for exceptions in subsection (3) will allow too many exceptions, particularly in those areas where we know that there is already discrimination. Clearly, some people who discriminate wish to discriminate; they will think that they have good reason to do so and they will seek exceptions. There will have to be objective justification for those exceptions in a way that the Government did not require when it came to some of the part 2 exceptions for religious organisations, religious charities and faith schools. 
I would be grateful if the Minister assured us that the exceptions made in such regulations will be subject to objective justification and that there will be a high threshold for exceptions because of the distinction that I have urged her to consider between matters to do with religion and those to do with sexual orientation. One is a belief, the other is a part of who one is to a far greater extent. Subsection (3)(e) makes a clear reference part 2: 
''whether or not of a kind similar to those provided for by Part 2 of this Act''.
That is indeed the question. Will the regulations be similar to those provided for by part 2 or will they be drawn more stringently? 
I am conscious of that concern, which is held by Stonewall and others from the lesbian and gay community and those who support them, because in the employment regulations in respect of sexual orientation, where one would have thought that the threshold for exception would be higher because they deal with one's income, career and means of support, a broad exception was made for religious organisations. I consider it to be very broad, as did the trade unions, Stonewall and other such organisations. The exception is over-broad because it allows religious organisations to continue to discriminate either on the basis of doctrine or because significant offence would be caused to a significant number of the congregation of that religion. That is as high a test as that given in part 2, but even that was too broad and too low a threshold for the exceptions than that that should be warranted by this clause. 
Since the Government clearly felt that they could allow people to point to doctrine or say that a significant number of their congregation would be offended if they continued to employ a gay person, does the Minister think that such exceptions are appropriate, civilised and likely to arise from part 3? It is an important point. The record of our debates will show that the matter was highly controversial. We would feel much less happy about giving regulation-making powers to the Government to provide exceptions like those in the employment regulations or anything broader. Although the clause is welcome compared with the original draft of the Bill, I hope that the Minister understands that there is great concern about the delay that has occurred and the hierarchy that has been created, and a worry that there will be over-broad exceptions for discrimination against people on the grounds of sexual orientation.

Meg Munn: Good morning, Mrs. Anderson. I thank the hon. Member for Beaconsfield for the way in which he moved his amendment and the spirit in which that was done, which was helpful. As hon. Members know, we accepted the amendments that inserted clause 80 on Third Reading in the other place. We were pleased to be able to accept the amendments as they offered a welcome way to address the considerable concerns shared by many Members of both Houses about the absence of protection from sexual orientation discrimination in the provision of goods, facilities, services and public functions. Let me tell the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon (Dr. Harris) that it was not a subject of compromise. There was concern that the amendments tabled to replicate part 2 would not achieve the desired outcomes and the present route was deemed to be a more acceptable way of achieving a shared aim.
The Government are strongly committed to achieving full equality for lesbian, gay and bisexual people. We have demonstrated that commitment in  numerous ways since 1997, and we are proud of our record. Let remind hon. Members of a few of the important steps that we have taken. We have equalised the age of consent for gay men, repealed section 28 of the Local Government Act 1988 and outlawed discrimination in the workplace on the grounds of sexual orientation. The latter was mentioned by the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon. We must examine that issue in the context of the provision of goods, facilities and services. It is too early to say whether we will adopt the approach that was used for the employment regulations. However, we are well aware of concerns on that matter. 
The Government have also passed the Civil Partnership Act 2004, and this week we celebrated its coming into force. We have also taken action to tackle homophobic crimes and issued guidance on tackling homophobic bullying. The power provided in clause 80 will lead to a further important change in the law. The regulations will mean that gay men and lesbians need no longer put up with the discriminatory treatment that has blighted areas of their daily lives for too long. We intend to implement sexual orientation discrimination regulations in October 2006, alongside the religion and belief provisions in part 2 of the Bill. That answers questions that have been raised by hon. Members in Committee and on Second Reading. Those measures bring us a welcome step closer to achieving the comprehensive rights for gay, lesbian and bisexual people that this Government have been working to achieve for eight years. 
The amendments raise questions about the scope of the regulations, and whether it should be possible for them to cover harassment. As hon. Members will know, harassment in the context of public functions was originally included in part 2 of the Bill, but was removed by amendments in another place. As the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Wythenshawe and Sale, East, made clear in a previous sitting, that was not the Government's will, but we have accepted that in the specific context of religion or belief discrimination, it is appropriate that that issue should be considered further in the context of the discrimination law review. However in the context of the sexual orientation order-making power, we have not yet had the opportunity to carry out the detailed consideration of the issues and consultation with interested stakeholders that was done before the provisions in part 2 were drafted. It would, therefore, be inappropriate to limit the scope of the order-making power as proposed. 
We have always said that new measures to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination should be developed through close consultation. That must include those who are discriminated against, the businesses and public sector organisations that provide the services that will be covered by the regulations, as well as other groups—for example, those who hold religious convictions. We propose to publish a consultation paper early next year setting out the issues to facilitate that process so that we can develop appropriate and targeted regulations that are effective in tackling sexual orientation discrimination. 
I hope that hon. Members will agree that consultation is essential. In response to the point raised by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield, we want to engage in a very detailed process that involves all the interested parties. We expect that a great deal of time and effort will be given to that consultation because, as he said, the regulations cannot be amended and we want to ensure that we have taken account of the full range of views.

James Brokenshire: I thank the Minister for that clarification. Could she go further and give any indication of how long she anticipates the consultation will take and therefore when the regulations might be introduced?

Meg Munn: The hon. Gentleman is getting very good at interventions—he knows that, as soon as someone takes a breath, that is the point at which to jump up. I said earlier that we intend to implement both the provisions on religion and belief the sexual orientation regulations by October 2006. We must therefore begin the consultation process fairly quickly. I hope that members of the Committee will bear with me on the exact details, but that time scale requires us to move fairly quickly if we are to meet the deadline.

Evan Harris: Will the Minister clarify whether she would consider adopting the approach to consultation that I suggested? My concern is that the first time that we will see the regulations will be when the Government table them for approval by both Houses of Parliament. At that point, it is more difficult politically for the Government to withdraw them, take them away and redo them. Would the hon. Lady consider an approach in which there is the opportunity to comment on draft regulations before they are tabled to be voted on, rather than merely inviting comment on a consultation paper on the issues? That might give the Government greater flexibility.
Meg Munn rose—
Mr. Grieve rose—

Meg Munn: I give way to the hon. Gentleman.

Dominic Grieve: I agree with what the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon has just said. One of the problems, as I am sure the Minister is aware, is that when the Government put out regulations for consultation, all sorts of people fail to notice. It is only when the regulations actually arrive in Committee on the day on which they are debated as a statutory instrument that everyone is suddenly up in arms because they see something that they do not like. One possibility that the Minister might like to consider—I think that it would be a novel approach, although it may have been done previously—would be to submit the draft statutory instrument to the relevant Select Committee, so that questions could be asked about it and comments made before it was presented to the House.

Meg Munn: I thank both hon. Gentlemen—a double intervention; I have never done one of those before. I will think about what would be the best way forward. We want to adopt an approach that really does enable hon. Members, as well as all the other  people to whom I have referred, to be properly consulted.
The Government have been criticised, not just this morning, for not moving quickly on this issue. However, moving quickly has its dangers because if the processes that the hon. Gentlemen have mentioned are to achieve what they should achieve, they will take time. We want to move as quickly as we can, because we have taken into consideration people's concern that the religion and belief regulations and the regulations on sexual orientation be introduced at the same time. That puts some constraints on the process. However, as I said, I shall consider the hon. Gentlemen's proposals. 
Ideally, the Government wish to proceed on the matter within the context of the discrimination law review. That is why we initially resisted calls to undertake this process at an earlier stage. We believe that the benefits of the discrimination law review are that we can examine our approach across the whole range of inequality and discrimination issues and arrive at a much more comprehensive, simple and easy-to-understand framework which deals with all those issues. 
We have been a listening Government in responding to the calls to act more quickly, but the discrimination law review is available to deal with any issues that arise subsequently. In saying that, I am not saying that I do not want to have a proper consultation; I am trying to reassure hon. Members that if issues arise after the regulations in relation to a whole range of matters of law—hon. Members will be aware that sometimes there are unintended consequences of legislation—we will have the opportunity to put any matters right through the discrimination law review and the subsequent steps that will be taken leading to a single equality Bill, as is set out in our manifesto. I hope that that provides some comfort.

Evan Harris: What the Minister is saying is that the outcome of the discrimination law review will not be available before the regulations are made. I understand what she says in that regard. Given the controversy about harassment, I think she is suggesting that there is a need to ensure additional consultation or thought-sharing about harassment in respect of these regulations pending the full outcome of the discrimination law review, and particularly about how harassment will be dealt with in relation to the religion strand and other strands that have not yet been tackled. Is that a correct understanding of the timing, and can she give an assurance that there will be further discussions with hon. Members about how harassment will be dealt with, given that we have this vacuum?

Meg Munn: The hon. Gentleman should perhaps wait to hear what I was about to say on that.
On the discrimination law review, our commitment is to a Green Paper in the spring—who knows, we may have a long spring next year—and then to develop our further thinking on the basis of that consultation. 
On the specific issue of harassment raised by the amendment, it is precisely because we do not at this  point want to rule out the possibility of including it in the regulations that we do not want to limit the scope of the regulations that can be made under the clause at this point, but we will give proper consideration to that in the consultation. 
It was extremely regrettable that the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon referred to a hierarchy of inequalities. That was not helpful and is not our intention. The fact that we are asking the discrimination law review to have a proper look at the framework on discrimination indicates that we recognise that progress has been made for different sections of our communities in ways that are not helpful to people seeking redress for discrimination or to people providing goods and services and employing people. I particularly regret that the hon. Gentleman used the word ''provocative''. We are not being provocative; we are responding to concerns that have rightly been raised by people outside and inside the House. The hon. Gentleman should welcome the progress that we are making. 
I have made the case against the amendment and I ask the hon. Member for Beaconsfield to withdraw it.

Dominic Grieve: I have listened carefully to the Minister. She will appreciate that these are probing amendments.
The situation is unsatisfactory and I believe that the Minister acknowledges that. One asks oneself whether a whole lot more time and trouble will be spent if the Government do not accept that when the review has taken place they should introduce a short Bill to cover these areas. Such a Bill would enable the matter to be considered in this place and the other place, and in Committee. When dealing with a matter of such importance, which we must get right, and when there is unanimity of aim throughout the parties in the House on what we want to achieve, that is all the more reason to ensure that the detail is correct. 
The Minister knows the reality and we all know what we intend, but there is always the law of unintended consequences. As she rightly highlighted, the rights of people not to be discriminated against on the grounds of sexual orientation, for example, might clash with the rights of people to practise their religion or belief properly, and balancing those rights is a real problem. Somehow, we in the House must find our way through that maze. I wish the Government well in doing that by consultation, but the problem with consultation is that it comes to an end. My experience is that consultation involving hon. Members never works because we have far too much on our plates to become involved in scrutiny and response by letter to the Government's request for views. Inevitably, the matter lands up in Committee as part of a statutory instrument, and then suddenly everybody is up in arms about it when some of the problems could have been ironed out earlier. I have seen that happen far too often not to realise that that is the way that the world works. 
The apparent inability of Members of the House, whether in Standing Committee or Select Committee, to express their views about the detail will be one of the real problems that the Government will have to face. I urge the Minister to find a way in which a Select Committee can comment on the draft regulations. They will need to be published long before they are put before each House because what the Government say they intend to do and what appears in the regulations can often be different, albeit unintentionally. We discussed that in earlier sittings. That is all the more reason why, with something of such complexity, there should be a full opportunity for that to happen. 
The proposals were probing amendments. I concede that there might be circumstances when we want harassment on the grounds of sexual orientation, but not on the grounds of religion or belief. That is a logical position to adopt. I do not want to be prescriptive today and remove the harassment clauses. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Dominic Grieve: I beg to move amendment No. 160, in clause 80, page 46, line 1, leave out 'may' and insert 'shall'.
This is really the promulgation of our earlier debate, and I do not intend to take up much of the Committee's time. Clearly, ''shall'' is prescriptive and ''may'' provides the Government with great latitude, so we must ask ourselves to what extent we want to fetter the Government and say what they should be doing. It could be argued that by inserting ''shall'' into the clause, we are saying that they should be producing something similar to the discrimination rules under part 2 of the Bill. The probing amendment is designed to ensure that the Government understand that people will be looking to the provisions under subsection (3), including exceptions and definitions that are elsewhere in the Bill. As the Bill is drafted, the Government have a let-out clause. They could produce regulations that bear no relation to the rest of the Bill and it would be within their powers to do so. That is the problem with Henry VIII clauses. The position is unsatisfactory.

Celia Barlow: I was delighted to hear the Minister say that she aims to move as quickly as possible and that, at the same time, there should be consultation on goods and services. I am worried, however, that the power to make regulations in respect of goods and services discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation should be considered at the same time as other provisions under the Bill. I was pleased that the Government accepted the amendment tabled by Lord Alli in another place. I know from my constituents in Hove and Portslade exactly how important the regulations will be to many of them. That was highlighted on Monday at an event that the Minister and I both attended to celebrate civil partnerships.
I want to establish what timetable the Government have in mind. It is important to set out when and how the regulations will be introduced. There has been great worry about that. There has even been some  mischief-making on behalf of the Green party, which said that regulations on sexual orientation will be delayed. It is important to give the lesbian and gay community an assurance that what will happen will happen, and happen quickly. The changes in terms of sexual orientation should be implemented at the same time as those on religion and belief in part 2, because that would signal to both gay and faith communities that no discrimination will be tolerated. It would also make things easier for the businesses and services that are involved, for example, with the civil partnership. In my constituency, a number of companies and businesses have been set up purely to cater for this change in legislation. However, other businesses with a more varied and eclectic clientèle would find it difficult if the regulations were brought in piece by piece. 
I know that consultation still has to take place on the scope of the Bill, and I welcome the fact that we have been given an indication as to when it will start. However, it is vital both that the protections should be comprehensive and robust and that we should have a clear idea of the timetable for their introduction. The lesbian, gay and bisexual community feel that they should have equality with the other communities that are covered so excellently in the Bill.

Meg Munn: As the hon. Member for Beaconsfield has said, the effect of the amendment would be to require the sexual orientation regulations to do all the things listed in clause 80(3)(a) to (i). That would be undesirable. If we were to carry out our consultation in that context, our hands would be tied with regard to the outcome. I should not like that to happen. As an approach to developing new regulation, it would not meet the most basic better regulation test that secondary legislation should be brought forward only where it is necessary and appropriate.
To respond to my hon. Friend the Member for Hove (Ms Barlow), I said earlier, as she acknowledged, that we aim to introduce these regulations together with those on religion and belief. That reflects the approach that was taken in relation to employment regulations. Our target date for that is October 2006. She is right to raise the issue of the response of businesses, whoever their customers are. That is one of the categories that we want to ensure has the opportunity to comment on the consultation. I do not want to set out a more specific timetable at this point because that would be unhelpful in that it would tie our hands. Everybody on all sides is seeking the same outcome, so it would not be sensible to do that. However, we are aware that it is already December 2005, so the processes need to commence very shortly. 
On my hon. Friend's comments about the need for comprehensive and robust regulations, we must aim for the best regulations that we can have. The opportunities that are presented by the discrimination law review, which is well under way, enable us to continue to keep all matters under review. We can consider them as we work to develop a simple but comprehensive framework that will cover all groups. I am sure that hon. Members will agree that it cannot be right to limit our options in a significant manner at this stage—that would be to deny ourselves the opportunity to produce properly targeted  regulations that are likely to be effective in addressing the sort of discrimination that we want to use this order-making power to tackle. 
I hope that hon. Members will agree that a key advantage of the order-making power in clause 80 is that it allows us to address the issue of sexual orientation discrimination at the earliest possible opportunity, without denying us the opportunity to take the time needed to explore and resolve fully the complex issues that arise in this area before detailed proposals for legislation are introduced. I appreciate the way in which the hon. Member for Beaconsfield spoke to the amendment, but I ask him to withdraw it.

Dominic Grieve: I am grateful for the Minister's response, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Janet Anderson: May I say for the benefit of the Committee that the general provisions of the clause have been thoroughly aired, so I do not propose to call a stand part debate unless any members of the Committee seriously object to that?
Clause 80 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 81 - Prohibition of discrimination

Dominic Grieve: I beg to move amendment No. 164, in clause 81, page 47, line 4, leave out sub-paragraph (c).

Janet Anderson: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 165, in clause 81, page 47, line 5, leave out sub-paragraph (d).
No. 166, in clause 81, page 47, line 6, leave out sub-paragraph (e). 
No. 167, in clause 81, page 47, line 7, leave out sub-paragraph (f).

Dominic Grieve: We now consider public functions in relation to sex discrimination. The clause would make it unlawful for a public authority exercising a function to do any act that constitutes such discrimination.
Exactly the same issue—exemptions to the prohibition—applies to this clause as to the clause on religious discrimination. The grounds for exempting from the provisions the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence Service, GCHQ and the part of the armed forces of the Crown that assists GCHQ are, however, even weaker than the ones that may apply in the case of religious belief. I know that it has become almost standard practice in House of Commons and House of Lords legislation of this sort to include those bodies in the list, but I hope that the Minister will explain in detail why that is necessary. 
After all, I should have thought that any issues of national security would apply identically to people of whatever orientation, whether gay or heterosexual, and it is difficult to understand why this particular exemption should be applied. Will the Minister say, as far as she can, what internal mechanism may operate in those organisations to allow complaints to be made administratively if the protection of the Bill is not extended to people working in those organisations?

Meg Munn: I thank the hon. Gentleman for creating the opportunity for the Committee to discuss the exemptions that apply to the intelligence agencies in the context of sex discrimination in the same way that we did when we discussed national security matters in the context of part 2 on Tuesday.
As the hon. Gentleman said, Amendments Nos. 164 to 167 would remove from clause 81 the exceptions provided in that clause for the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence Service, GCHQ and the parts of the armed forces that assist GCHQ in accordance with the requirement of the Secretary of State. 
The amendments would make it unlawful for the intelligence agencies, as we may collectively call them, to commit any act in exercising their functions that would constitute discrimination or harassment. In the light of Tuesday's debate, and from what the hon. Gentleman has just said, I understand that he wants me to set out the rationale for exempting the intelligence agencies from the prohibition on discrimination, the reason why the Government believe that the exemption should remain, and why we cannot accept his amendments. 
When we considered the policy on sex discrimination in public functions and any exceptions to it, we paid close attention to all the relevant issues when we developed the exceptions provided for in new section 21A of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. We considered the specific circumstances of sex discrimination and the exceptions to the comparable provisions relating to discrimination in public functions in the Race Relations Act 1976 and the Disability Discrimination Act 1995. It is not surprising that many of the exceptions that we have provided mirror those in the race and disability prohibitions, as there are obvious reasons for consistency. That includes the exceptions for certain bodies exempted for constitutional or national security reasons, such as Parliament and the security services. 
However, we did not simply slavishly roll forward the status quo into this legislation. Our view is that the exemption is justified. The intelligence agencies need to be as unfettered as possible in the discharge of their activities and responsibilities. We need to remove from them any uncertainty about whether they are falling foul of the discrimination requirements. There may be sound operational reasons for exercising their functions in respect of one sex or another. If they were not exempt, that might constitute unlawful discrimination, and that is simply not what we want to achieve. We do not want to apply such constraints to their operational autonomy, or cause uncertainty about whether they are breaching discrimination laws when conducting activities that have an overwhelming operational logic. 
The hon. Gentleman made a fair point about an internal mechanism for dealing with the issue; I hope that he is content for me to write to him to reassure him and other Committee members about the processes. These days, we have to be especially vigilant about national security matters, as I am sure that all Committee members agree, and the  arrangements for exclusion of the intelligence agencies from the prohibition on discrimination are proportionate to the need. I invite the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

Dominic Grieve: I am grateful to the Minister for her response. I certainly look forward to her letter setting out the internal administrative procedures. I believe that there are some in place; indeed, at one level there is a system involving a senior High Court judge, to whom complaints about various kinds of impropriety by the security services can be brought internally. I rather assume, therefore, that there is also a complaints procedure for those who think that they are being unfairly discriminated against on any basis. It would be helpful for the Committee to know exactly how that works. Subject to that, I accept that there is some merit in what the Minister says, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Vera Baird: I beg to move amendment No. 139, in clause 81, page 48, leave out lines 30 and 31 and insert—
'The provision of separate services exclusively or primarily to members of one sex where justified by a legitimate aim and where the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.'.

Janet Anderson: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment No. 140, in clause 81, page 48, leave out lines 32 to 37 and insert—
'The maintenance or adoption of specific measures to prevent or compensate for disadvantages linked to sex, where justified by the aim of ensuring full equality in practice between men and women and where the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.'. 
Amendment No. 141, in clause 81, page 49, leave out lines 1 to 16. 
New clause 14—Sex discrimination exceptions for public authorities— 
In the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (c. 65) the following shall be inserted after section 34— 
''35 Exceptions for Public Authorities 
(1) Sections 29 (1) and 30 shall not be construed as rendering unlawful— 
(a) the provision by public authority of the goods, facilities and services exclusively or primarily to members of one sex where justified by a legitimate aim and where the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary; or 
(b) the maintenance or adoption by a public authority of specific measures to prevent or compensate for disadvantages linked to sex, where justified by the aim of ensuring full equality in practice between men and women and where the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary. 
(2) In subsection (1), a 'public authority' includes any person certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature.''.'.

Vera Baird: The amendments and the new clause are an attempt to point to a solution to a problem in the clause. The amendments have a techie aspect to them, although the issues that they address are deep, so it will take me a moment to set out my point.
As my hon. Friend the Minister says, clause 81 puts new section 21A into the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. The new section outlaws sex discrimination in the discharge of public functions by a public authority or a private body. In effect, it reverses a House of Lords case, and it is new and very welcome. 
There are exceptions to the new duty not to discriminate, which are set out in subsection (9) of new section 21A. The ones that I am concerned about allow for the provision of single-sex services where they are appropriate; I am thinking of domestic violence refuges for men or women, single-sex swimming lessons, and that kind of thing. Of course, in parts 3 and 5 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 there is already a duty not to discriminate on the basis of sex in the delivery of public services such as education and health. There are exceptions to that older duty, too—again, to permit the delivery of single-sex services where they are appropriate. However, although new section 21A will outlaw sex discrimination in the delivery of public functions, and parts 3 and 5 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 outlaw sex discrimination in the delivery of public services, the exceptions in the two pieces of law are quite different in ways that will cause problems. Those in the old Act are much narrower than those in new section 21A. I share the view of the Equal Opportunities Commission, to which I am indebted, that the exceptions in new section 21A are too wide and could easily be abused to evade its legislative purpose. 
Amendments Nos. 139 to 141 would therefore narrow those exceptions and make deletions as appropriate. They do that by substituting a much more stringent test for the justification of single-sex provision. They refer to the definition in the 2004 European directive implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services. The directive does not include the wide exceptions in new section 21A, but takes a principled approach to exceptions to the duty against sex discrimination. It bases those exceptions on the very good principle of proportionality, under which separate services are 
''justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.''
That is language with which lawyers who contend in human rights and equal rights areas are very familiar. That proportionality test is clear and is one of principle. 
In any event, the equal treatment directive, which provides the test in my amendments, comes into force in the UK in December 2007. If the wide tests in new section 21A remain, they will, at the very least, have to be interpreted in the light of the new directive from December 2007. One will have the wide tests in the new section for six months and then the narrower tests controlled by the directive. That does not seem to be the right way to go about setting up a new duty against discrimination and recording exceptions to it. 
If amendments Nos. 139 to 141 were accepted, they would narrow the extent of the exceptions to the new public duty in new clause 21A. However, they would leave untouched the exceptions to the duty in the 1975 Act not to discriminate, which are very different from the exceptions in the new section and the equal treatment directive. Consequently, new clause 14 would also include in the 1975 Act the tests for exceptions from the directive. As a result, the exceptions to the duty in new section 21A and in  parts 3 and 5 of the Sex Discrimination Act would be narrower and the same as each other. Again, that is linked to the principle of proportionality—I did warn the Committee that this issue had its techier aspects. However, the import of the amendments is to narrow the exceptions to the new duty not to discriminate and to make them the same as the old duty not to discriminate. That is what this is all about. 
Why do that? If we are introducing duties not to discriminate, it is rational to ensure that the exceptions are the same. The accident that the policy has changed in the 25 years between the first Act and the second—so there are different exceptions—does not help when trying to set down the law, which needs to be clear. 
There is no reason why there should be different tests. The duty not to discriminate on the grounds of sex in the 1975 Act applies to the delivery of public service across the board, including education and health, which is a wide area. The duty not to discriminate in the performance of a public function, which would be included by the new section, is a much narrower provision in terms of reach, but there is no reason why the exceptions should be different. 
Although I said that one is a narrow area of activity and the other is a broad area of public activity, it is not clear which duties placed on public authorities will fall within which provision. For instance, if we consider a typical argument for an exception to the duty not to discriminate on the basis of gender, such as the provision of a domestic violence refuge, there is widespread agreement from a policy perspective that such places should be single sex, but individuals have attempted to challenge public authorities for not providing refuges for men when they provide refuges for women. 
If the local authority provided a refuge, it would be delivering a public service, which would fall under the duty in the old Act and the exceptions would be those under that Act. If the local authority funded another organisation to set up a domestic violence refuge, it would not be acting under the old Act and relying on its exceptions, but would be acting under the new section and relying on the wider exceptions contained in it. So, if there were two identical domestic violence refuges funded in different ways, one might be a lawful exception and the other might not, because the exceptions are different. 
I hope that the example I have given makes the point that the two duties are alike, but they are not easy to separate. There is no rational reason why the exemptions should be different. The amendment attempts to narrow the exemptions, compatible with achieving the purpose of an end to discrimination on the basis of sex and bringing the two bits of legislation close together. I hope that I have managed to explain that, without sending everybody to sleep or confusing them hopelessly. Obviously, there is a techie aspect, but I am sure that the Minister can grasp that that is important when one is introducing new duties. The gender duty, which goes way beyond stopping discrimination and into the promotion of gender equality, will also be impacted on by the incompatibility of exceptions. That is the wrong way to introduce a new duty. The new duty has to be clear  and everybody has to understand what is outside it, but with the current mismatch between the 1975 Act and the new proposal, that will not happen.

Dominic Grieve: I have considerable sympathy with the amendments tabled by the hon. and learned Lady and I look forward to hearing the Minister's response. The amendment reflects the equal treatment directive and therefore that is likely to be the test that will be applied in any event and will, ultimately, be the interpretation through which the provision Government has drafted will be looked at.
The amendments have the merit of a slightly greater degree of simplicity, rather than the series of repetitive statements in the Bill. Having said that, however, perhaps the Minister can provide a compelling reason why the current wording should remain. The hon. and learned Lady makes her most powerful case in saying that if that interpretation test is to be applied within 12 months in any event—and I believe that that is the case—it seems slightly strange that it should not be in the Bill, especially as my impression is that it will achieve exactly the same result as the Government's own wording.

Sandra Gidley: The hon. and learned Member for Redcar (Vera Baird) has explained the situation well and I do not propose to repeat all that she said.
I strongly support her amendment, because it seems to me that the provision will cause great confusion, not least for local authorities. They have to implement the goods and services directive by April 2007, but eight months later the goalposts will be moved. Not only does that seem unhelpful to local authorities but it widens the scope for potential mischief makers. There are always people who try to challenge things that they do not like, particularly as far as the provision of single-sex services is concerned, and the scope for such people to bring cases will, it seems, be widened. The issue will ultimately be settled only when there is firmer case law, although I am sure that that is not the Government's intention. 
To go back to the domestic violence refuge example, the provision of a refuge will fall under either of the Acts in question, depending on who provides the funding. However, ancillary services are also provided to those refuges and it is not clear which piece of legislation they will fall under, although it seems to me that many such services will fall under the auspices of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. It is generally unhelpful to have that disparity in a similar area of policy—to have to look to different pieces of legislation according to who provides the services. It would be much simpler to align the two in the way outlined by the hon. and learned Lady. I am not wholly familiar with all the details, but I gather that there have been similar problems as a result of differences between the Race Relations Act 1976 and statutory instruments with a slightly different flavour that have been introduced later. 
If the Minister assured us that all would be brought into line, we would probably all be reassured. It would be helpful to know whether she is aware of the potential problem that has been mentioned and is happy to live with it, or whether something is going to be done to eliminate that potential problem.

Meg Munn: Clause 81 amends the Sex Discrimination Act by inserting new section 21A, which extends the Act to prohibit sex discrimination in the exercise of public functions, subject to certain exceptions. The clause includes a table of exceptions that sets out circumstances in which the prohibition of discrimination does not apply. A number of those exceptions are for the provision of separate services for men and women when that is a more effective way to provide the services, or when they are needed to overcome disadvantages affecting only one sex.
Amendments Nos. 139, 140 and 141 would remove those exceptions completely and replace them with the drafting in the amendments. They are designed to create single-sex exceptions compatible with the gender directive. New clause 14 would introduce a new or replacement section into sections 29 to 30 of the 1975 Act, which deal with goods, facilities and services and premises, setting out comparable exceptions for public authorities to provide separate services for men and women. It aims to achieve consistency in the exceptions between section 21A and sections 29 and 30—my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar was right to say that it all gets a bit technical. The new clause also introduces a new definition of public authorities that differs from the one used in other parts of the Bill. 
I am aware of the concerns expressed by the Equal Opportunities Commission about the exceptions to the new provisions that the clause introduces into the Sex Discrimination Act. New section 21A prohibits discrimination on grounds of sex in the exercise of public functions. I understand that although the EOC welcomes the aim of providing exceptions for gender specific needs, it has a number of concerns—first, that the exceptions are too wide and may, if not qualified, allow discrimination intended to be prohibited by the new section 21A; secondly, that the exemptions may not be compatible with the gender directive; and thirdly, that there is inconsistency between the new exceptions and those in sections 29 and 30 of the Sex Discrimination Act dealing with goods, facilities and services and premises. 
We have given all those points careful thought and I shall deal with each in turn. First, however, I will explain why the new prohibition is an essential part of the Bill. It is needed to provide comprehensive protection against sex discrimination in the delivery of public functions, thus bringing public sector activities such as policy making, decision making, administrative functions and, where not already covered, service delivery within the Sex Discrimination Act. It is also essential to underpin the gender duty. There has been a general welcome for the new provision. When drafting it, we took care to ensure that the provision would not lead to banning public functions that take the form of services that are best delivered on a single-sex basis. That type of  service must be allowed to continue and must not be stopped by this extension of the law. The main purpose of the exceptions is to permit that. 
I shall deal together with the breadth of the exceptions and compatibility with the gender directive. Amendments Nos. 139 to 141 address those issues. When drafting the exceptions, we considered whether there was a need to qualify them along the lines proposed by the EOC and sought the advice of parliamentary counsel. He advised that the current drafting was fully satisfactory, but agreed that it was advisable to ensure that there could be no conflict with provisions of the gender directive. As a result we made an amendment to the clause on Third Reading in the other place to amend new section 21A(4) of the Sex Discrimination Act to make it clear that the provisions of community law, which include the gender directive, have primacy. No further action is needed on that score. 
New clause 14 addresses the EOC's third point, on the need for consistency between the new exceptions and those in sections 29 and 30 of the Sex Discrimination Act dealing with goods, facilities and services and premises. That arises because many services provided by public authorities fall under the provisions of that Act applying to goods, facilities and services, where narrower exceptions apply. The fact that the boundary between a public authority's activities that would be regarded as a service and those that would be classed as public functions is not always clear makes for some uncertainty about which exceptions may apply in a particular case. 
I appreciate that that is not ideal. For a period prior to the introduction of the single equality legislation, different sets of exceptions will apply to the two areas. However, the question of definitions and exemptions in discrimination legislation, both in the Sex Discrimination Act and in other statutes, needs to be looked at across the board, and the discrimination law review is the right place to do that. Making ad hoc changes in the Bill, which would soon be superseded by the single equality Bill, is not the right approach. The discrimination law review will allow debate and discussion, and lead to effective solutions for the longer term. 
I appreciate the need to provide maximum clarity to public authorities—a point that has been raised by hon. Members. We will do all we can to make sure that public authorities are well informed about changes ahead. Providing clear, timely guidance will be the best way to manage any practical difficulties arising from the introduction of new section 21A. 
I understand that the new definition of public authorities proposed in the amendment reflects concerns that the wording used in the Bill to define them may prompt questions about whether different definitions are intended from those in the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Disability Discrimination Act 2005, which establishes the duty on public authorities to promote equality in respect of disabled people. That is not the case. Although the wording used may be slightly different, the policy intention and, in our view, the legal effect is the same. The very small differences in wording reflect the parliamentary draftsmen's  approach to drafting. There is no difference of substance between the definition in the Bill and those used in earlier measures. We intend them to have identical breadth and are confident that a court would not interpret the definitions differently. 
On the gender duty, the Equal Opportunities Commission expressed concern that a public authority's employment functions might be excluded from the gender duty because of the definition used in clause 81. I assure the Committee that the gender duty covers the breadth of a public authority's activities, including its employment functions. Those are covered by both limbs of the duty. The first limb contains the requirement to have due regard to the need to eliminate all sex discrimination that is made unlawful by the Sex Discrimination Act, including the prohibition on discrimination in employment in part II. The second limb contains the obligation to have due regard to the need to promote equality of opportunity between women and men. That obligation covers everything that a public authority does, including its employment functions, its services and its public functions, such as its policy, regulatory and enforcement work, to the extent that they are relevant to gender equality. 
I am not persuaded that the amendments are necessary. It is important that we introduce a new prohibition on sex discrimination in the provision of public functions now, and provide the necessary exceptions, recognising that further consideration will be given in the discrimination law review. I hope that my hon. and learned Friend will consider withdrawing her amendment.

Vera Baird: Of course I shall. The important thing is not to push the amendments into the Bill but to be satisfied that the Government are well apprised of the complex nature of the problem and its potential impact. It is clear from the Minister's reply that they are.
I wonder about my hon. Friend's comments on the definition of a public authority. I do not think that that was part of my proposals. It may be in amendment No. 47, which was not selected. However, the answer was very interesting all the same. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
Clause 81 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 82 - General duty to promote equality, I beg to move amendment No. 143, in clause 82, page 50, line 1, leave out 'and'.

Janet Anderson: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 144, in clause 82, page 50, line 2, at end insert
'and 
(c) to promote equality of opportunity for those with unpaid responsibility for the care of another person or persons.'.

Vera Baird: This amendment is not techie at all, really. My purpose is to probe how the new duties will help carers by proposing the addition of a duty to promote equality for unpaid carers. I am by no means  attempting to add a further strand of equality at this stage of the Bill's progress; I simply wish to find out what the Government think about the position of carers.
The Equality Commission for Northern Ireland deals with caring as a separate strand; there is a positive duty on public bodies which includes promoting equality between persons with dependants and persons without dependants. In the future we may have to consider some specific provision in relation to carers. For the moment I am questioning whether the duty to promote equality for women and men will adequately ensure that the caring that they both do will be recognised by public bodies covered by the duty in the way they design their services and in their employment practices. 
It will be for a public authority to ensure that it is promoting sex equality once the gender duty comes into force. Although there is no bar on any individual challenging discrimination thereafter, the point is to try to prevent that. My concerns come under two headings: parents and carers other than parents. EOC research shows that fathers increasingly want to play an active part in their children's lives, with eight out of 10 new fathers saying that they would like to stay at home to care for their new child. Other EOC research shows that fathers of under-fives are doing about a third of child care. 
None the less, society still works on the assumption that mothers continue to be the main carers, and public service providers might correctly interpret the new gender duty as meaning that they have to adjust their services to reach both men and women carers. For example, GPs might be more flexible in allowing men to attend with their children; but if the health centre provides a mother and toddler group, will the primary care trust realise that it needs to include those men who look after their children? 
When considering non-parent carers—those with caring responsibilities—I was surprised to discover that the gender divide is more evenly split, with 11 per cent. of men and 14 per cent. of women aged over 16 providing care. It is often unpredictable, but carers do not like to ask for time off or for flexibility—caring is less visible than parenthood, and it is not often recognised as a legitimate reason for any sort of flexibility. The Government propose extending the right to request flexible working to carers, which is welcome. However, because caring does not split along gender lines, it will be difficult to ensure that the particular needs of carers will be dealt with by the duty to promote equality. 
If carers were all women or all men, one could see how proper provision could be made through the application of the gender duty, but as they are so mixed it is not at all clear that their special interests will be recognised by public authorities in a sufficiently detailed way. I would be interested to know the Government's thinking on the problem.

Meg Munn: I am grateful to my hon. and learned Friend for moving the amendment. She will be aware that the Government are keen to consider the sensitivities and complexities of balancing working lives with caring responsibilities. We recognise the enormous and valuable contribution that carers make to society and we are keen that they should have greater recognition.
My hon. and learned Friend has helpfully described the issues that face carers and discussed the important question of the roles that men and women take. The Government have and will continue to act to ensure the recognition of carers. Employment legislation since 1997 has helped women to advance in the workplace and enabled parents and carers to balance work and family life. The Work and Families Bill, which had its Second Reading on Monday, will extend the law to cover carers of adult relatives; they will be able to request flexible working from April 2007. The Bill before the Committee will empower the Commission for Equality and Human Rights to carry out the important role of the Equal Opportunity Commission for promoting equality for parents and carers. That will be done by raising awareness and encouraging good practice in equality and diversity. 
The amendments propose that a duty be laid on public authorities to promote equality of opportunity for carers. However, they are not the best way forward. I have said before that our good friend the discrimination law review is considering the duties that should be required of public authorities. That is the right place to deal with the complex issues that will arise when extending the duty to cover carers. We would need to consider the issues in detail and consult interested and affected parties, especially on the scope of the term ''carer''. That will include consideration of other public sector duties to promote equality of opportunity between persons with dependents and persons without, including the one in Northern Ireland, to which my hon. and learned Friend referred. As she knows, we intend to bring forward a single equality Bill within the life of this Parliament, so the matter is not one of principle; it is about consultation and ensuring that the matter is properly considered. 
I thank my hon. and learned Friend for bringing the matter to our attention, and trust that she will withdraw her amendment.

Vera Baird: Again, I am happy to withdraw the amendment. I am very reassured and cheered by the obvious depth of the Government's understanding of the complexities that the new gender duty introduces and its effect on carers. We all look forward to being back in a couple of years to try to reconsider it all. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Evan Harris: I rise to give the Minister the opportunity to place on the record her explanation of the different definition of ''public authority'' in the context of a question that I am going to ask. I had not expected her to explain the matter before. 
In clause 82(2)(a), the term ''public authority'' is defined to include—as it is in the previous clause, I should say— 
''any person who has functions of a public nature''.
The definition in the Human Rights Act 1998 is: 
''any persons certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature''.
The wording is different. This is a sensitive area, because case law has not given as wide a definition of ''public authority'' as some people, myself included, would like. It would be helpful if the Minister explained—if there is an explanation—why the wording is different and gave an assurance that the one in the Bill is no narrower than the definition under the Human Rights Act, which as I said, is slightly different. The wording 
''any person who has functions of a public nature'' 
is easily capable of encompassing people who have some public functions as well as private functions. It would help if the Minister could make that clear.

Meg Munn: I made this clear only a few moments ago, but the hon. Gentleman was not in the Room. For clarity's sake and because it is an important part of the Bill, I shall say a few words on the public sector duty.
On whether the use of different definitions from the ones in the Human Rights Act and the Disability Discrimination Act are intended, let me say that although the wording may be slightly different, the policy intention and the legal effect are the same. It is a very small difference in the parliamentary draftsman's approach, but no difference of substance between the clause and earlier provisions. 
The clause introduces into the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 a duty on public authorities to promote equality of opportunity between men and women. It is similar to the duty that public authorities currently  have to promote opportunity and good relations between different racial groups, and their recently approved duty under the Disability Discrimination Act 2005 to promote equality of opportunity between disabled persons and other persons. 
To put the clause into context, we announced in the White Paper establishing the Commission for Equality and Human Rights in May last year that steps would be taken to introduce a public sector duty to promote equality of opportunity between women and men. Following the Government's equality statement in the context of the McPherson inquiry into the murder of Stephen Lawrence, action on race was swiftly taken to impel institutional change as quickly as possible by legislating for a public sector duty on race equality. Although it is still early days, a report issued in 2003, ''Towards Racial Equality'', found that just under 70 per cent. of respondents felt that their work to date on the public duty had produced benefits leading to a positive impact on the approach that public bodies take to matters relating to race and ethnicity. As the Committee is aware, the Government passed a similar duty to promote equality for disabled people in the last Session of Parliament. 
Clause 82 introduces a similar duty in relation to gender. It will build upon legislation that has advanced equality for women and men. After 30 years of legislation, it is clear that there still remains room for improvement in achieving a lasting cultural change and this is the opportunity to ensure that public services can lead the way. Creating a truly responsive public service means ensuring that public authorities are fully aware— 
It being twenty-five minutes past Ten o'clock, The Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order. 
Adjourned till this day at One o'clock.